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plication of some of his results [is] still on the rise,” even though he was not on a par
with the great geniuses of his time. Teller is also remembered as a great educator who
reveled in the popularization of science.
Hargittai’s magnum opus is more than a biography or a history of science or ther-
monuclear weapons. The book is a fascinating history of an individual caught in the
upheavals of the twentieth century.
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I ªrst heard of Pavel Stroilov in an article published by Claire Berlinski in the spring
2010 issue of The City Journal titled “A Hidden History of Evil: Why Doesn’t Anyone
Care about the Unread Soviet Archives?” The article describes Stroilov’s claim that he
had exploited a computer ºaw and stolen thousands of pages of documents from the
archive of the Gorbachev Foundation. These documents, the article claims, portrayed
Mikhail Gorbachev as an evil and menacing manipulator and shed light on unsavory
aspects of the end of the Cold War that allegedly would be highly embarrassing for
many a retired statesman. Berlinski, who seemed unaware of the vast amount of schol-
arship that has been published based on research in the Russian archives, also main-
tained that Stroilov had approached Yale University Press to publish a book about the
First Gulf War but that something supposedly “frightened” then-editor Jonathan
Brent so that Stroilov “never heard from Brent again.”
Stroilov later shared his manuscript with me. I could immediately see why Yale
University Press would not want to publish it, though I kept my reservations to myself
out of politeness. Subsequently, Stroilov’s book came out with Price World Pub-
lishing, a low-budget press that specializes in weight-training and ªtness books pub-
lished under titles like 6 Weeks to 6-Pack Abs, Gluteus to the Maximus, and Muscle Ex-
plosion. This is Price World’s ªrst foray into history. My impression after reading the
ªnal product is that the publisher would have done well to stick with its usual fare.
Stroilov’s book, despite its outstanding documentary base (of which I will say more
below), is a disaster.
Stroilov believes he has uncovered an international conspiracy—chieºy directed
by Gorbachev, but with the assistance of U.S. President George H. W. Bush—aimed
at returning Israel to its 1947 borders as a quid pro quo for Iraq’s withdrawal from Ku-
wait. Gorbachev’s anti-Jewish “socialist jihad” was part and parcel of his mission of
“conquering the world” by using the “Red Arabs” of the Middle East, especially the
Iraqis, Syrians, Libyans, and Egyptians, as his proxies. Bush (who, Stroilov suggests at
one point, was Gorbachev’s “agent”) was duped into playing along because he was so
heavily invested in building a “new world order” (p. 167). To this end, Bush bartered
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away “common sense, decency, and national interest,” falling into Gorbachev’s hid-
eous trap and incurring “debts,” which the United States subsequently tried to repay
by bolstering the remaining “Red Arabs” at the expense of Muslim democrats, Egyp-
tian Christians, and, needless to say, the Israelis, whom Washington repeatedly “be-
trayed” (e.g., pp. 223, 323, 345). A Masonic conspiracy (p. 60) also factors into the
story.
Devoid of any scholarly analysis, the book is full of nonsense, some of it derived
from far-fetched interpretations of Stroilov’s source material and some borrowed from
popular conspiracy theories. Fortunately, Stroilov is relatively brief with his own com-
ments. Most of the book is made up of verbatim transcripts of documents, including
memoranda of Gorbachev’s conversations with foreign leaders, Politburo transcripts,
and various enlightening notes penned by Gorbachev’s chief foreign policy aide,
Anatolii Chernyaev, and by other ofªcials. Although excerpted and often cited out of
context, these documents offer an interesting glimpse into the dynamic of Gorba-
chev’s policymaking and disclose hitherto unknown aspects of Soviet diplomacy dur-
ing the ªrst Gulf War.
Perhaps the most interesting documents are those that show Gorbachev’s
eleventh-hour efforts to broker Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait, especially his memo-
randa of conversations with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz in September 1990 and
February 1991. Gorbachev comes across as deeply hostile to the expanding U.S. pres-
ence in the Gulf, as he pleads with Aziz not to give the Americans a pretext for launch-
ing a ground offensive: “If . . . the Americans get very deeply involved in the military
action, including on the ground, it will not be so easy to take a course in the interests
of Arabs and the world community” (p. 285). The documents suggest that Gorbachev
was genuinely concerned that Saddam Hussein’s deªance would end in Iraq’s com-
plete collapse and the resultant expansion of U.S. inºuence in the Middle East.
Gorbachev’s well-known mediation in the conºict therefore aimed not so much at
achieving a peaceful solution as at maintaining Soviet regional inºuence.
In general, Stroilov’s documents show Gorbachev to be a strategic thinker, con-
cerned with the preservation of Soviet interests in the Middle East and consistently
suspicious of U.S. policy in the region. Thus, we see Gorbachev argue at a Soviet Po-
litburo meeting on 12 February 1987 regarding South Yemen: “We have little interest
in that country itself. But the most important thing for us is the place where it is situ-
ated” (p. 93; emphasis in original). We also see Gorbachev working hard to expand
Soviet inºuence in the region by selling weapons to the Egyptians, the Iranians, and
the Yemenis who would “otherwise . . . take them from the USA” (p. 94). Predictably,
most of Gorbachev’s anti-American rhetoric dates from the early years of his rule,
something that Stroilov fails to note. Nonetheless, some of the documentary evidence
presented here tallies with the excellent studies by historians like Artemy Kalinovsky
and Svetlana Savranskaya. The evidence suggests there was more to Gorbachev than
his myth would allow, with considerable continuity between pre-1985 and post-1985
Soviet policies toward the Middle East and other parts of the world.
How new and how reliable are Stroilov’s documents? As for the novelty, most of
the “top-secret” documents cited in the book have long been available to historians.
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This includes, in particular, Chernyaev’s diary, an immensely valuable resource. What-
ever one can say about the other documents cited here, it was completely unethical for
Stroilov to steal a person’s private diary. Fortunately Chernyaev over the past twelve
years has published almost all of his diary in Russia, and the National Security Archive
has posted translations of the sections pertaining to 1985–1991. The Gorbachev
Foundation also has published many of the Soviet Politburo records and some of the
memoranda of conversations cited by Stroilov. Other records are freely available at the
Foundation’s archive in Moscow to anyone interested. Nevertheless, some of the pre-
sented material is clearly new and has not been published before. Although it is im-
possible to say with complete certainty until Stroilov releases the original documents,
they also appear authentic.
A comparison between Stroilov’s documents and those that have been released by
the Gorbachev Foundation in published volumes reveals a disturbing tendency by the
Foundation to omit inconvenient evidence. This can be said, for example, of the
aforementioned reference to South Yemen, which is absent from the published tran-
script of that Politburo meeting. There are dozens of similar examples. Thus, even
though Stroilov’s book is analytically worthless, it is helpful to scholars in pointing to
instances of falsiªcation of the historical record. The Gorbachev Foundation has
clearly tried to put the best “spin” on Gorbachev, but it has done so in ways that un-
dermine its own credibility. The most important lesson of this book, therefore, is that
unless Gorbachev prefers to have his legacy interpreted by Masonic conspiracy theo-
rists on the basis of stolen documents, he should embrace Chernyaev’s proposal to re-
lease the full treasure-trove of documents still tightly held by the Foundation.
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